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Abstract—On 2 May, 2019, during the UK local elections, an e-voting trial was 
conducted in Gateshead, using a touch-screen end-to-end verifiable e-voting 
system. This was the first trial of verifiable e-voting for polling station voting in the 
UK, and it presented a case study to envisage the future of e-voting. 	
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
An electronic voting (e-voting) system uses 
electronic technologies to record, store and 
process ballots in a digital form. In general, 
there are two types of e-voting systems. One 
type is designed for local voting in a polling 
station, where a touch-screen machine, called 
Direct Recording Electronic (DRE), is typically 
used to record votes. The other type is 
designed for remote voting, where voters can 
cast their votes from anywhere via the Internet. 
   Today, e-voting has already been deployed 
in a number of countries. It is used in many 
states in America in various forms, e.g., based 
on optical scan or DRE. In India, a fully 
electronic voting system called Electronic 
Voting Machine has been used in all national 
elections since 2004. Brazil started its DRE-
based elections in 2002. In 2007, Estonia 
allowed Internet voting for national elections 
for the first time. In 2019 during the Estonian 
parliamentary election, 44% of ballots were 
cast using Internet voting. 
  The e-voting systems as currently used in 
real-world elections in the above countries 
generally work like a trusted “black-box” that is 
critically dependent on the integrity of the 
internal software implementation. However, 
voters have no means to verify the internal 
software. For example, as demonstrated by 
Springall et al. [1], if the server software in the 
Estonian Internet voting system had been 
compromised, the integrity of the whole 
election would have been lost without voters 
even knowing it. Publishing the source code 
can help promote trust, but it cannot resolve 
the fundamental problem as one cannot 
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	guarantee that the same software is used 
unmodified on the election day.  
   To address the trust problem on e-voting 
software, Rivest and Wack first proposed the 
notion of software independence: “a voting 
system is software-independent if an 
undetected change or error in its software 
cannot cause an undetectable change or error 
in an election outcome” [2]. The software-
independence principle essentially requires 
that a voting system should guarantee security 
without depending on details of the internal 
software implementation, since voters have 
means to access and verify the software. 
   There are various approaches to build a 
software-independent voting system [2], 
among which the most promising one involves 
applying cryptography to make the voting 
system end-to-end (E2E) verifiable. Being E2E 
verifiable encompasses the following aspects: 
 
1. Cast-as-intended: a voter can verify 
that a ballot is  cast correctly for the 
intended candidate. 
2. Recorded-as-cast: a voter can verify 
that a cast ballot is  recorded correctly 
in the system. 
3. Tallied-as-recorded: a public observer 
can verify that all the recorded ballots 
are tallied correctly. 
 
A system that satisfies the above requirements 
is said to be E2E verifiable. Besides 
verifiability, an E2E voting system must also 
preserve voter privacy, ensuring that the ability 
to verify that their vote cannot be misused to 
reveal how they have voted to a third party, 
say a coercer.  An overview of the E2E 
verifiable voting systems in a real-world setting 
can be found in [3]. 
   The potential of an E2E voting system for 
real-world elections has been demonstrated in 
a number of studies. In 2009, Helios, an E2E 
Internet voting system, was used to elect the 
university president of the Université 
Catholique de Louvain (UCL) in Belgium [4]. 
Scantegrity, a scanner-based E2E voting 
system [5], was adopted in the municipal 
elections of Takoma Park, USA in 2009 and 
2011. In 2014, Prêt à Voter (PaV), based on a 
hybrid method using a touch-screen machine 
and a scanner, was adopted in the 2014 
Victoria State election in Australia [6].  
  Although progress has been made in E2E 
verifiable voting, large-scale deployments of 
this technology are still limited due to two main 
reasons. First, most of the E2E voting systems 
require a group of  tallying authorities (TAs) 
who are supposedly trustworthy individuals 
with computing and cryptographic expertise to 
perform the complex decryption and tallying 
operations. Finding and managing such TAs 
has proved to be difficult [4]. Second, the E2E 
systems tested in polling stations, such as 
Scantegrity and PaV primarily use paper at the 
voting stage. Although they improve the 
system security by introducing E2E verifiability, 
the complex handling of paper ballots (e.g., 
using a special pen in Scantegrity and tearing 
the ballot into halves in PaV) is not any easier 
than the traditional paper ballots. 
   Recent research in this field has shown that 
it is possible to construct fully electronic E2E 
verifiable voting systems without involving any 
TA, using a new paradigm called “self-
enforcing e-voting” (SEEV) [7]. The removal of 
TAs can significantly simplify election 
management and make the system much 
more practical than before. The first SEEV 
system, called DRE-i due to Hao et al. [7], 
adopts a pre-computation strategy to encrypt 
ballots before the election in a structured way 
such that multiplying the ciphertexts after the 
election will cancel out random factors and 
hence allow everyone to verify the integrity of 
the tallying result without TAs. A prototype of 
DRE-i has been used for mobile phone-based 
classroom voting [8]. The second SEEV 
system, called DRE-ip due to Shahandashti 
and Hao [9], adopts an alternative real-time 
computation strategy to encrypt ballots during 
voting, while keeping an aggregated form of 
the random factors in memory. When the 
election has finished, the system publishes the 
final aggregation of the random factors along 
with other audit data to allow the public to 
verify the tallying integrity without involving any 
TAs. By removing the need to store pre-
computed ballots, DRE-ip provides a stronger 
guarantee of vote privacy than DRE-i and is 
particularly suited for polling station voting. A 
touch-screen based implementation of DRE-ip 
for polling station voting was trialed in the 
		
campus of Newcastle University in May 2017 
with positive feedback from voters. 
   Based on the initial success of the campus 
trial, the research team reached out to the 
Gateshead council in Newcastle, UK, with a 
proposal to trial the system with real voters in 
a realistic polling station environment. This 
proposal was supported by the electoral 
officials in the Gateshead council, and was 
subsequently approved by the council. It was 
agreed that an e-voting trial would be held on 
2 May, 2019 at the Gateshead Civic Center 
polling station as part of the UK local elections. 
  This trial differs from all previous e-voting 
pilots in the UK in that the trialed system is 
E2E verifiable rather than a “black-box”. 
Outside the UK, this trial also represents the 
first time that a fully-electronic E2E verifiable 
voting system was tested in a polling station by 
real voters. It was hoped that the results of this 
trial would present a useful case study for 
researchers as well as election law and policy 
makers.  
   The rest of the paper is organized as follows. 
Section 2 explains the DRE-ip system that was 
used in the Gateshead trial. Section 3 gives 
details of the trial. Section 4 discusses the 
voter feedback and results. Finally, Section 5 
concludes the paper with suggestions for 
future work.  
 
2. DRE-IP VOTING PROTOCOL 
 
High-level view. At a high level, a self-
enforcing e-voting (SEEV) system can be 
explained using the analogy of a picture. 
Imagine an election as a picture that is formed 
of millions of pixels. Every voter holds a key to 
one pixel. The voter’s privacy is protected 
because each individual pixel does not reveal 
the value of their vote. However, when all 
pixels are pieced together, they collectively 
show a picture that is the election tally. 
Everyone will be able to compute/verify the 
tally without involving any TAs. However, only 
the tally, not an individual vote or any partial 
tally, can be learnt. If an attacker attempts to 
modify pixels or the tally, the tampering will be 
publicly noticeable since the mathematical 
relations between the pixels will fail to be 
verified. DRE-ip [9] is an instantiation of a 
SEEV system based on real-time computation 
(as opposed to DRE-i [7] that is based on pre-
computation). The protocol is summarized 
below. 
 
Setup. Let   and   be two large primes where 
  divides   − 1. The protocol operates in the 
subgroup of   ∗  of prime order   . In this 
subgroup,  1  are  2  two random generators 
whose discrete logarithm relationship is 
unknown. In the implementation, this is 
realized by first choosing a non-identity 
element as  1  and then computing  2  based 
on using a one-way hash function with 
inclusion of election specific information in the 
input, such as the date, title and questions. For 
simplicity, the DRE-ip protocol is described 
here for a single candidate (Yes/No) election. 
It can be easily extended for supporting 
multiple candidates as shown in [9]. 
 
Voting. After authentication, a voter casts a 
vote on a DRE machine in two steps. First, 
they are presented with a “Yes” or “No” option 
for the displayed candidate on the DRE 
screen. Once the voter makes a choice, the 
DRE prints the first part of the receipt, 
containing   ,    =  2   ,    =  1    1    
where   is a unique ballot index number,    is 
a random number chosen uniformly from [1,  − 1] , and     is either 1 or 0 
(corresponding to “Yes” or “No”). The 
ciphertext data also comes with a zero 
knowledge proof (ZKP) to prove that     and 
    are well-formed [9].  
   In the second step, the voter has the option 
to either confirm or cancel the selection. In 
case of “confirm”, the DRE updates the 
aggregated values   and   in memory as in 
Equation 1, deletes individual values    and 
   , and marks the ballot as confirmed on the 
receipt.  
  =     and   =    
  (1) 
In case of “cancel”, the DRE reveals    and 
   on the receipt, marks it a cancelled ballot 
and prompts the voter to choose again. The 
voter can check if the printed    matches their 
previous selection and can dispute it if it does 
not. The voter can cancel as many ballots as 
they wish but can only cast one confirmed 
ballot. Since voting is anonymous, the 
	machine cannot guess if, after having printed 
the first part of the receipt, the voter is going to 
"confirm" or "cancel". 
   After voting, the voter leaves the voting 
booth with one receipt for the confirmed ballot 
and zero or more receipts for the cancelled 
ballots. All data on the receipts are digitally 
signed and are also available on a public 
election website. To ensure the vote is 
recorded, the voter just needs to check if the 
same receipt has been published on the 
election website. 
 
Tallying. Once the election has finished, the 
DRE publishes the final values   and   on the 
election website, in addition to all the receipts. 
Anyone will be able to verify the tallying 
integrity by checking the published audit data, 
in particular, whether the two equalities in 
Equation 2 hold for the confirmed ballots:     =  2   and     =  1  1 
  (2) 
3. E-VOTING TRIAL 
 
Ethics. The trial was ethically approved by the 
Electoral Services of the Gateshead council 
and the Research Ethics Committee of the 
University of Warwick. Participation in this trial 
was entirely voluntary. To avoid any 
perception of likely bribery, no financial 
compensation was allowed to pay for the 
voter’s time, not even free coffee or tea. 
However, sweets were permitted. So, two 
packs of sweets (about £2.5 for 200 pieces) 
were purchased and made available to all 
voters regardless whether they took part in the 
trial or not.        
   Since the security of DRE-ip has been peer 
reviewed in a published paper, the main aim of 
the trial was to evaluate the usability of the 
system and its public acceptance in 
comparison to traditional paper ballots. The 
initial plan was to conduct the trial as an exit 
poll, so the tallying results could have been 
compared with the official election results. 
However, during the ethics review, a concern 
was raised that since an e-voting device was 
never used in any exit poll before, some voters 
might confuse the trial with the real election. 
To address this concern, it was decided to use 
dummy candidate names for the trial. The 
voting question and the dummy candidate 
names were provided by the Council based on 
a sample paper ballot used in an election 
education program. During the briefing, voters 
were explicitly informed that the candidate 
names used in the trial were dummy ones.    
 
Implementation. The DRE-ip system used in 
the trial was implemented over an elliptic curve 
(NIST P-256) rather than a finite field setting 
for better efficiency. This does not change the 
protocol specification. The system consisted of 
a server and multiple clients. Each DRE client 
comprised a touch-screen Tablet (Google 
Pixel C 10.2 inch) connected to a thermal 
printer (Epson TPM-P80). Two clients were 
installed in the trial venue, supporting voting in 
parallel. The clients were connected to a 
remote server where all the cryptographic 
operations were performed. The network 
connection was provided via a wireless dongle 
(Huawei 4G). Although the Gateshead Civic 
Center provided free wi-fi to all visitors on the 
election day, the 4G dongle was used for the 
assurance of more reliable Internet 
connectivity. All the electronic devices were 
off-the-shelf equipment and could work in 
battery-only mode. Portable power banks were 
included in the setup in case the electrical 
power became unavailable in the venue. 
Therefore, other than requiring a physical 
space, the trial setup had minimum 
dependence on the IT infrastructure in the 
polling station. Figure 1 shows the setup on 
the election day. Since it was a trial, the DRE 
clients were placed in an open space. In a real 
election, each should be put in a separate 
voting booth. 
 
 
		
 
   Figure 1. Trial setup at the polling station 
 
Election day.  The trial was chosen to be held 
at Gateshead Civic Center, which was the 
busiest polling station in Gateshead. On 2 
May, 2019, the Gateshead Civic Center polling 
station opened at 6:30 am for voting. Voters 
walked into the polling station (inside a hall as 
indicated in Figure 1) to vote as normal using 
paper ballots. Upon exiting the polling station, 
they were invited to take part in a voluntary 
trial using e-voting. Ninety-four voters (out of a 
total of about 200 voters who attended that 
polling station) participated in the trial.   
    After the voter consented to participate, they 
were first asked if they would like to watch a 
short 1-minute video demonstration on how to 
use the system. About one third of the 
participants chose to watch it, while the 
majority decided to vote straightaway.  
   To cast a vote, the voter first picked up a 
folded slip of paper with a random 9-digit 
passcode from a glass jar. This passcode 
would allow the voter to log in to the DRE to 
cast a vote while remaining anonymous. With 
the passcode, the voter chose one of the 
provided DRE clients and started their voting 
session. Figure 2 shows a series of 
screenshots to illustrate the voting process. 
First, the voter logged in to the DRE using the 
9-digit passcode. The screen then displayed a 
list of candidates. The voter touched the 
screen to select a candidate. Meanwhile the 
thermal printer printed the first part of the 
receipt. Based on [8], only a truncated hash 
(50 characters in Crockford’s base-32 
encoding) was printed on the receipt, while the 
complete crypto data including the digital 
signature was published at the election 
website. Next, the voter needed to either 
"confirm" or "cancel" the selection. If “cancel” 
was chosen, the DRE client would return to the 
initial screen of the candidate selection and 
print the second part of the receipt for the just 
cancelled ballot (Fig. 3A). If “confirm” was 
chosen, the voting session would terminate 
and the DRE client would print the rest of the 
receipt for the just confirmed ballot (Fig. 3B).  
 
 
      (1) login          
             
 
      (2) List of candidates  
 
 
       (3) Select candidate    
 
 
      (4) Cancel selection 
 
	 
  (5) Select candidate again            
 
 
(6) Confirm selection 
 
Figure 2. DRE screenshots during voting 
 
         A. Cancelled ballot           B. Confirmed ballot 
Figure 3. Examples of receipts 
 
After the trial, voters were provided with an 
(optional) questionnaire to provide anonymous 
feedback. Results of the feedback will be 
presented in the next section.  
   The polling station closed at 10:00 pm to 
mark the official end of the election. 
Immediately after 10:00 pm, the tallying results 
for the e-voting trial were published at the 
election website along with full audit data 
(which can be downloaded as an XML file). 
The audit data was subsequently checked by 
the research team and was found to be 
verified successfully. The same verification 
could be performed by anyone using the 
provided open-source software or any 
independently developed software. The 
system recorded 93 confirmed ballots and 11 
cancelled ballots, with a total of 94 
participating voters. The apparent absence of 
one confirmed ballot was because one voter 
logged in to the tablet but chose to exit and 
eventually not to vote (this voter came to the 
polling station to cast a protest vote and 
wanted to do the same on the e-voting system).   
 
4. PARTICIPANT STUDY DESIGN 
 
Questionnaire design. The main part of the 
questionnaire was designed to assess the 
usability of the voting process based on a 
common set of System Usability Scale (SUS) 
statements first developed by John Brooke 
[10]. Respondents indicate their agreement or 
disagreement with each statement using a 
five-point Likert scale, where 1 = “strongly 
disagree”, 2 = “disagree”, 3 = “neutral”, 4 = 
“agree” and 5 = “strongly agree”. Based on 
pilot testing prior to the trial, it was found that 
the first statement was potentially confusing. 
The original statement was “I think that I would 
like to use this system frequently”, and it was 
changed to “I think that I would like to use this 
system in future elections” to better fit the 
context of the trial. The rest of the statements 
were left unchanged.     
   The usability assessment was focused on 
the voting process instead of the verification 
process. This was for two main reasons. First, 
since the trial was conducted with real voters 
in a busy polling station, the time available for 
each participant to vote and to complete a 
survey was limited. Second, while voting is 
mandatory, verification is an optional operation. 
In practice, dedicated auditors may be 
employed to verify “cast as intended” by 
casting cancelled ballots at any time during the 
election day; voters may give receipts to a 
helper in the polling station to verify “recorded 
as cast” by checking if the same receipts are 
published at the election website; anyone with 
access to the election website is able to verify 
“tallied as recorded” by using the open-source 
software to check the published receipts and 
the tally. Hence, none of these verification 
operations is mandatory for an ordinary voter. 
The assessment of the usability for the 
verification process will be done in future work.  
   In addition to the SUS questions, the 
questionnaire also collected demographic 
information about the participant and their 
background, including gender, age, education, 
experience of using computer/touch-screen 
		
devices, and whether or not they had watched 
the video demo before voting.     
   The last part of the questionnaire asked the 
participant “based on your experience of using 
paper ballots and e-voting, which system do 
you prefer”? Participants were asked to 
indicate their preference on a 5-point scale, 
namely, (1) strongly prefer paper, (2) prefer 
paper, (3) neutral, (4) prefer e-voting and (5) 
strongly prefer e-voting. Participants could 
optionally write free text to explain their choice.  
 
5. RESULTS 
 
Demographics. Based on 93 returned 
questionnaires, the gender distributions among 
the participants were 39.8% “female”, 53.7% 
“male”, 1.1% “other” and 3.2% “prefer not to 
say“. The age distributions were 1.1% “below 
20”, 8.8% “20-29”, 27.5% “30-39”, 24.2% “40-
49”, 23.1% “50-59”, 13.2% “above 60” and 2.2% 
“prefer not to say”. While 11.3% of the 
participants attended “secondary school”, 
others vary among “college” (28.1%), 
“undergraduate degree” (22.5%), 
“postgraduate degree” (34.8%) and “Prefer not 
to say” (3.4%). Experience of using computer 
or touch-screen devices ranged from “never” 
(3.4%), “occasionally” (6.7%), to “sometimes” 
(4.5%), “often” (30.3%) and “extensively” 
(55.1%). Only 34.8% of the participants 
indicated they had watched the video demo 
prior to voting.  
 
Completion of voting. All participants were 
able to complete voting without error. In 
general, a 9-digit passcode is all that was 
needed for a voter to carry out voting by 
themselves by following the on-screen 
instructions. Only one voter encountered 
difficulty in touch-screen voting and asked the 
research team for help. This voter pressed the 
tablet screen really hard like a push button, but 
the touch screen did not respond under hard 
pressing. The issue was resolved by advising 
the voter to touch the screen more gently. It 
turned out that this particular voter had no prior 
experience of using any touch-screen device. 
 
SUS scores. Using the SUS computation 
method [10], the mean SUS score was 87.9 
(the standard deviation or STD was 13.8). By 
the commonly used criteria [11], this score is 
considered “excellent” in usability. It is higher 
than the reported SUS score of 76 for Helios, 
60 for PaV, 58 for Scangrity, and is 
comparable to 89 for STAR-vote [12]. It is 
worth noting that the user study in [12] was 
conducted in a lab environment with 30 
recruited volunteers (paid $25 each), while the 
Gateshead trial involved 94 real voters in a 
real polling station with no payment for each 
participant.  
   Based on the analysis using the Spearman 
correlation method, the SUS score is found to 
be uncorrelated with the age, gender or 
education background. However, it is positively 
correlated with the voter’s experience of using 
computer/touch-screen devices (Spearman 
correlation coefficient 𝜌 = 0.28, and two-tailed 
  = 0.008). It is inversely correlated with the 
watching of the video demo prior to voting 
(𝜌 = −0.35,   = 0.001): those who chose to 
watch the video scored lower in SUS. This is 
counter-intuitive, but may be due to a self-
selection effect: since watching the video was 
a voluntary choice, those who opted to watch it 
tended to be those who felt less comfortable 
with touch-screen e-voting. This is 
corroborated by the negative correlation 
between watching the video and the voter 
preference: those who chose to watch the 
video were more in favor of paper than e-
voting (𝜌 = −0.235,   = 0.027). 
 
Voting time. The voting time was recorded 
from the moment that the voter started 
entering the passcode to the finish of the 
voting session. It ranged from the minimum of 
10 seconds to the maximum of 116 seconds 
with an average value of 33 seconds (STD = 
17 seconds). This compares favorably with 
previous studies, which report mean voting 
time 450 seconds for Helios, 550 seconds for 
PaV, 620 seconds for Scantegrity and 272 
seconds for STAR-Vote [12]. The substantially 
shorter voting time for DRE-ip is due to two 
factors: 1) the touch-screen interface was 
entirely electronic without involving any 
manual handling of paper ballots as in other 
systems; and 2) the "confirm/cancel" choice 
was smoothly integrated into the voting 
process as a natural voter-initiated auditing 
step. Indeed, after the voter entered the 
	passcode, they typically took only 2 touches 
on the screen to cast a vote. More touches 
were needed only when the voter opted to 
cancel the vote and re-start from the initial 
screen. Overall, the response time for 
interacting with a touch screen is much quicker 
than filling in a physical paper ballot by hand.  
 
Voter preference. Between the traditional 
paper ballots and the trialed DRE-ip system, 
there was a clear preference among voters for 
the latter, as summarized in Figure 4. The 
choice of preference was positively correlated 
with the SUS score (𝜌 = 0.59 ,   = 0.000 ), 
which suggests that usability is one key factor 
in deciding the voter preference. 
  
 
(1) Counts of voter preferences 
 
(2) Correlation with SUS scores 
Figure 4. Summary of voter preferences 
 
   Among those who preferred or strongly 
preferred e-voting (55 in total), 48 of them 
provided written comments. Three main 
reasons can be summarized from the provided 
comments. The dominant reason seems to be 
the ease of use: 30 voters (out of 48, or 63%) 
commented that they preferred e-voting as 
they found it “easier”, “more convenient” and 
“simpler” than paper ballots. The next reason 
appears security: 21 voters (44%) mentioned 
that the ability to verify the vote made them 
feel “safer” and “more secure”, as one voter 
commented: “I can double check my vote, it 
seems more secure/protected than hand 
counting paper ballots”. Another voter 
commented: “Given a receipt at the end gives 
assurance that vote is counted”. The third 
reason is the speed of voting: 20 voters (42%) 
commented that they preferred e-voting as 
they found it “quicker”, and “faster”. This is 
corroborated by the mean voting time of 33 
seconds reported earlier. Besides these three, 
other reasons mentioned in the comments 
included the use of e-voting being more “cost-
effective” (4 voters) and  more “environment-
friendly” (1 voter). 
   Among those preferring or strongly preferring 
paper ballots (20), all of them provided written 
comments to explain their choice. Based on 
the comments, two main reasons can be 
identified. The first is down to the habituation: 
10 voters (out of 20, or 50%) commented that 
they were a “traditionalist”, “accustomed [to 
paper]” and “like the ritual of casting the paper 
vote”. One voter commented: “[paper voting] 
has worked for hundreds of years. Why 
change it now just because we can?” The 
second reason concerns the security: 8 voters 
(40%) mentioned security as a reason they 
preferred paper ballots. One voter commented: 
“I think a computerized system could be easily 
hacked which could affect the outcome of the 
ballot”. Another commented: “I would not be 
confident in the security of a system of this 
nature. It could be open to hacking or other 
manipulation”. It is worth noting that “security” 
was one main reason for both liking and 
disliking the trialed e-voting system. Other 
reasons mentioned in the comments included 
the paper ballot being “simpler” (1 voter), 
“quicker” (1 voter) and that the use of e-voting 
might disenfranchise people who “have 
disabilities and/or dyslexia” or “do not use 
computers” (2 voters).  
   Among those choosing “neutral” (16), 13 
provided further comments. The comments 
mentioned a range of reasons, such as 
simplicity, speed, security and tradition as 
covered above. One factor not covered before 
is that some voters chose “neutral” as they did 
not like coming to the polling station to vote, as 
one commented: “Not much time difference to 
actual voting [between paper and e-voting] - if I 
were able to do online and at home would be 
more beneficial.”  
 
Limitations and future work. The Gateshead 
trial was the first study to assess the feasibility 
		
of touch-screen based E2E verifiable e-voting 
for polling station voting. Although the user 
feedback shows a clear preference on the 
trialed e-voting system over paper ballots, 
several limitations of this study should be 
noted. First, the trial was confined to one 
polling station in a north-east region of the UK. 
Whether the result can be generalized to the 
whole voting population remains to be 
investigated. Second, the number of 
participants in the trial (94) was relatively small. 
Third, as the participation of the trial was 
entirely voluntary, there may be a self-
selection bias on the survey result. Fourth, in 
the trial, only the usability of voting is 
evaluated, not the usability of verification. 
These limitations will need to be addressed in 
further studies, e.g., by conducting more trials 
in distributed regions. Finally, a trial to 
compare E2E verifiable Internet voting and 
postal voting under a remote voting setting has 
not been carried out before and will be 
worthwhile to conduct as a future work.     
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
This paper summarises the results of the 
Gateshead e-voting trial, which was the first 
time that a fully electronic voting system with 
E2E verifiability was tested for polling station 
voting. Feedback from the participants in this 
trial indicates a clear preference of verifiable e-
voting over the traditional paper ballots. This is 
because many voters considered the former 
“safer”, “more secure”, “quicker” and “easier to 
use”. This shows the promising potential of 
deploying E2E verifiable e-voting in future 
elections. However, this trial also shows that 
22% of the participants still preferred or 
strongly preferred paper voting. This indicates 
that deployment of e-voting in any real-world 
election should be progressed with caution 
and a considerate plan to support every voter, 
especially those who may be unfamiliar with e-
voting or dislike it.  
   The Gateshead trial was conducted for a 
dummy election, within the existing legal 
framework of the UK election law, which only 
allows paper ballots for statutory voting. The 
results of this trial hopefully present a useful 
case study for voting policy makers with regard 
to the UK election law, which was written at a 
time when paper ballots were the only possible 
means of voting, but has not been updated to 
account for many developments of digital 
technologies in the modern era.  
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